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A. WHETHER ARTICLE 21.55 APPLIES TO A CLAIM FOR DEFENSE
COSTS UNDER A LIABILITY POLICYAN ongoing issue of debate in Texas is whether Article 21.55 of
the Texas Insurance Code' applies to an insured's claim for a
defense under a liability policy. Federal district courts in Texas
have generally held that a duty-to-defend claim constitutes a first-party
claim for purposes of Article 21.55 and continued to do so during this
Survey period. 2 However, in the first state appellate court decision to
provide an in-depth analysis on this issue, the Dallas Court of Appeals
concluded that Article 21.55 does not apply to claims for a defense.
There, based on the court's determination that TIG wrongfully refused to
tender a defense in the underlying lawsuit, the Dallas Mavericks con-
tended that TIG's wrongful refusal violated Article 21.55, thus entitling
the Mavericks to the eighteen percent statutory penalty. TIG countered
that Article 21.55 applies only to first-party claims for payment to an in-
sured or beneficiary and does not apply to claims for a defense. 3
Based on its examination of the language and purpose of Article 21.55,
the court of appeals determined that the entire structure of Article 21.55
presumes a tangible, measurable loss suffered by the insured for which it
seeks payment from the insurance company, and that "[any attempt to
apply the statute's structure to a claim for a defense is unworkable and,
based on the language of the statute, clearly unintended by the legisla-
ture."' 4 The court reasoned: (1) Article 21.55 is entitled "Prompt Pay-
ment of Claims," and a demand for a defense under a liability policy is
not a claim for payment, but rather a demand that the insurer provide a
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Travelers Indem. Co. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Res., 313 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (N.D. Tex.
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legal defense to the insured; (2) Article 21.55's definition of "claim" re-
quires that the claim be a first-party claim that must be paid by the in-
surer directly to the insured or beneficiary; when an insurer provides a
defense, the company pays the fees to the attorney engaged to represent
the insured, and the insured does not receive any direct payment as re-
quired by Article 21.55; and (3) both the statute's deadlines and its conse-
quences for failing to meet those deadlines presume that the insured's
claim is one for compensation for a covered loss rather than for a de-
fense.5 The court therefore concluded that Article 21.55 is not applicable
to an insured's claim for a defense. 6
In reaching this conclusion, the Dallas Court of Appeals recognized
that its holding is contrary to the holdings of other Texas state and federal
courts. The court, however, stated that few of those cases provide any
analysis, those that do discuss the issue only cursorily, and to the extent
the opinions of the federal courts offer any analysis of the issue, the rea-
soning relied upon is "faulty."' 7 Specifically, in those opinions, the federal
courts concluded that Article 21.55 applies to a claim for a defense be-
cause such a claim is a first-party claim made pursuant to a third-party
insurance policy. The Dallas Court of Appeals, however, reasoned that
the fact that a claim is a first-party claim is not sufficient in and of itself to
place it within the scope of claims to which Article 21.55 applies; rather,
the claim must also be one for payment to be made directly to the insured
or beneficiary, two factors which are not present in claims for a defense.8
The court therefore concluded that claims for a defense are fundamen-
tally different than first-party claims for payment based on a loss suffered
by the insured, and that the language of Article 21.55 cannot be applied
to claims for a defense in any meaningful way.9
The Northern District of Texas subsequently issued an opinion ex-
pressly disagreeing with TIG Insurance and concluding that the Texas Su-
preme Court would likely decide that claims for defense are first-party
claims for purposes of Article 21.55.10 Although this issue was raised in
an appeal before the Texas Supreme Court, the court determined that the
insurer's conduct did not violate the terms of Article 21.55, "whether or
not that statute properly applies to a liability insurer who fails to
promptly accept or reject its insured's defense," and thus did not resolve
this issue.11 Further, although a petition for review on this issue was filed
in the TIG Insurance case, the Texas Supreme Court denied review, again
declining to resolve this issue. 12 Given the ongoing conflict between state
and federal courts, this unsettled issue will continue to be one to watch.
5. Id. at 239-40.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 241.
8. Id. at 241-42.
9. Id.
10. Hous. Auth., 333 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
11. N. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685, 691 (Tex. 2004).
12. TIG Ins. Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd., No. 04-0474, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 153, at *1
(Tex. Feb. 11, 2005).
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B. WHETHER ARTICLE 21.21 AND THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING APPLY TO A CLAIM FOR DEFENSE COSTS
UNDER A LIABILITY POLICY
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Resources, a
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas addressed
whether Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code and the common law
duty of good faith and fair dealing apply to an insured's claim for a de-
fense under a liability policy. 13 The insurer argued that the Texas Su-
preme Court in Head14 held that a liability carrier owes no common law
duty of good faith and fair dealing to an insured in a third-party liability
context. In response, the insured argued that the case involved only a
first-party duty to defend claim, not a third-party indemnification claim
and, thus, Head was inapposite. The court, however, explained that be-
cause it was alleged in Head that the insurer's refusal to defend was a
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the duty to defend issue
was squarely before the Head court, which unambiguously held that the
refusal to defend cannot give rise to a tort claim for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. Following Head, the court dismissed the in-
sured's claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.15
Then addressing the Article 21.21 claims, the court noted that Article
21.21 does not explicitly exclude claims that are based on breach of the
duty to defend and there is no Texas Supreme Court case disallowing
such a claim. The court further noted that the supreme court stated in
Rocor that it could not identify a principled basis upon which to draw a
distinction between first-party and third-party claims when the insured
has been directly injured as a result of its insurer's unfair claim settlement
practices. 16 Although Rocor involved the duty to settle, the Northern
District found that the insurer had not established that the supreme court
would rule differently in the duty to defend context.1 7 The court there-
fore held that a private cause of action may be asserted under Article
21.21 when an insurer breaches its duty to defend its insured.18
C. COURT HOLDS THAT THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT DOES NOT HAVE
STANDING TO ASSERT CLAIMS AGAINST INSURER FOR VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 21.21 OR BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING
The Houston Court of Appeals addressed whether plaintiffs in an un-
derlying suit had standing to sue the insurers of the defendant for viola-
13. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Res., 313 F. Supp. 2d 648 (N.D.
Tex. 2004) (discussing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (recodified
in TEX. INS. CODE ANN. ch. 541 (Vernon 2004-2005))).
14. Md. Ins. Co. v. Head Ins. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1996).
15. Travelers Indem. Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
16. Id. (discussing Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253 (Tex.
2000)).




tion of Article 21.21 and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
based on the insurers' alleged misrepresentations concerning the amount
of insurance available for settlement. 19 Sections 4(10)(a) and 4(11) of
Article 21.21 prohibit an insurer from making various misrepresentations;
however, Article 21.21 provides that claims based on unfair settlement
practices, i.e. claims under section 4(10)(a), are unavailable to third-party
claimants. The court found that although the plaintiffs classified them-
selves as non-insured "persons" entitled to sue for misrepresentations
under section 4(11), they were in fact complaining about unfair settle-
ment practices, which are covered under section 4(10)(a).20 The court
emphasized that allowing third-party claimants standing to sue an insurer
would necessarily conflict with the duties that insurers owe their insureds,
and that the legislature could not have intended such a result. 21 Thus, the
court held that the plaintiffs had no standing to assert claims for breach of
an insurance contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, or
violations of Article 21.21 based on any conduct of the insurers prior to
the settlement agreement.22
The plaintiffs next argued that after the settlement was reached, they
became third-party beneficiaries of the policies and assumed standing to
bring suit for violations of the contractual and extra-contractual obliga-
tions owed by the insurer.2 3 The court explained that the supreme court
has held that in the context of a first-party lawsuit by an insured against
its insurer based on an agreed judgment, the insurer's contractual duty of
good faith and fair dealing does not extend beyond the signing of the
agreed judgment, and, therefore, any claims that the insured may have
against the insurer based on the agreed judgment sound in contract, not
in tort.24 The court concluded that, assuming the plaintiffs attained the
status of third-party beneficiaries of the policies, the insurers owed the
plaintiffs no extra-contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing thereaf-
ter; thus, any claims that the plaintiffs had regarding the alleged conduct
of the insurers following the settlement sounded in contract, not in tort.2 5
Therefore, the court also held that the plaintiffs had no standing to assert
claims for breach of an insurance contract, breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, or violations of Article 21.21 based on the alleged
conduct of the insurers subsequent to the settlement agreement. 26
19. Atlantic Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Butler, 137 S.W.3d 199, 206-07 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g).
20. Id. at 220-22.
21. Id.
22. Id.






D. COURT HOLDS THAT AN INSURER HAS STANDING TO BRING
CLAIMS AGAINST ANOTHER INSURER FOR VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 21.21
Conversely, the Western District of Texas has held that one insurance
company may sue another insurance company under Article 21.21.
There, the company was insured by Service Casualty under an occurrence
policy for one policy period and by Travelers under a claims made policy
for the next policy period. Travelers retained counsel to defend the in-
sured in the underlying suit, but the suit was ultimately settled by Service
Casualty. Service Casualty sued Travelers for recovery of the settlement
amount and for violations of Article 21.21. The court emphasized that
Article 21.21 states that "any person" who has sustained actual damages
caused by another's engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the business of insurance may maintain an action against the person en-
gaging in such practices. 27 The court determined that Service Casualty
met Article 21.21's definition of a "person," and that Service Casualty
alleged that it had sustained actual damages by relying on Travelers'
statement that it would defend and indemnify the insured, which could be
construed as a misrepresentation under Article 21.21.28 The court there-
fore concluded that Service Casualty had standing to bring suit under Ar-
ticle 21.21.29
E. AN INSURER'S BREACH OF CONTRACT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
MISREPRESENTATION SUPPORTING AN ARTICLE 21.21 OR
DTPA VIOLATION
In her suit for bad faith, violations of Article 21.21, and violations of
the DTPA arising from the insurer's denial of her mold claim, the insured
asserted misrepresentation claims alleging that the insurer represented
that its policy conferred certain rights, but later claimed the policy did not
confer such rights. The insured did not assert that the insurer ever told
her mold damage would be covered or that such representations induced
her to purchase the policy. Rather, the insured contended only that the
denials of coverage constituted a false representation because her claim
should be covered. Stated differently, the insured's argument was that the
insurer represented it would provide coverage under the terms of the pol-
icy and the insurer's denial means it misrepresented it would perform
under the contract. In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals em-
phasized that when the alleged misrepresentations concern a party's fail-
ure to fulfill its contractual duties, the alleged failure to later perform the
27. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.SA-04-CV-251-XR, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19797, at *11-12 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2004) (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
21.21, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005)).
28. Id.




duties does not constitute a misrepresentation under the DTPA.30 To ac-
cept the insured's reasoning would convert every breach of contract into
a DTPA claim.3 1 Because the insured offered no evidence of a misrepre-
sentation apart from the insurer's alleged failure to perform under the
insurance contract, the court concluded that the trial court properly
granted summary judgment against the insured on all of her misrepresen-
tation claims.3 2
F. IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 21.21, "REASONABLY CLEAR" DOES
NOT MEAN "COMPLETELY CERTAIN"
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reviewed a jury finding of a
knowing violation of Article 21.21 in a suit brought by the wife of the
deceased insured alleging that the insurer unreasonably delayed payment
on the proceeds of an accidental death policy. The court of appeals ex-
plained that Article 21.21 requires a good faith attempt to promptly set-
tle claims once liability has become reasonably clear. The insurer argued
that its liability did not become reasonably clear until it actually received
additional hospital records that it had requested. In rejecting this argu-
ment the court emphasized that the insurer was essentially asking it to
adopt a rule allowing insurers to delay settlement of a claim until liability
is absolutely and conclusively established, not just reasonably clear. The
court determined that an interpretation equating reasonably clear with
completely certain would allow insurers to delay indefinitely concluding
their own research of a claim without violating Article 21.21 and, there-
fore, was clearly unacceptable. Accordingly, the court concluded that
once the insurer received the proof-of-loss documents noting an acciden-
tal cause of death, the insurer's liability became reasonably clear and the
insurer was under a duty to use its best efforts in good faith to avoid
further delay, and therefore affirmed the jury's finding of a violation of
Article 21.21. 33
G. ARTICLE 21.21 DOES NOT APPLY TO SURETIES
During this Survey period, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed
whether Article 21.21 applied to a dispute over commissions to be paid
under an agency agreement between an insurer and an agency for the
30. DeLaurentis v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, No. 14-03-00164-CV, 2004 Tex. App.
LEXIS 8758, at *28-29 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2004, no pet.).
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also J&D Aircraft Sales, LLC v. Cont'l Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.3:03-CV-0007-
B, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21518, at *49 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2004) (stating that Texas deci-
sions are clear that when the alleged misrepresentations concern a party's failure to fulfill
its contractual duties, the alleged failure to later perform those duties does not constitute a
misrepresentation within the meaning of Article 21.21 or the DTPA).




agency to sell surety bonds on behalf of the insurer.34 Attempting to dis-
tinguish the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Great American Insurance
Company v. North Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1, 35 the court of
appeals held that because the case did not involve a dispute between ei-
ther an obligee on a bond or the insurer in its capacity as surety, the
dispute arose out of the "business of insurance" and Article 21.21 there-
fore applied. 36 However, shortly after the end of this Survey period, the
Texas Supreme Court reversed the Fort Worth Court of Appeals' judg-
ment and rendered judgment that the agency take nothing. The supreme
court emphasized that by limiting the scope of Article 21.21 to "the busi-
ness of insurance," the legislature intended it to apply to a species of eco-
nomic enterprise, not to particular contracts on a piecemeal basis, and
that the holding in Great American excluded the business of suretyship
rather than the particular parties involved. 37
H. FOR AN INSURER TO PREVAIL ON A TRADITIONAL MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON AN INSURED'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE
DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING, THE INSURER MUST
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THAT IT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals articulated the standard to be ap-
plied when an insurer moves for a traditional summary judgment on the
insured's claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing on
the ground that there was a bona fide coverage dispute.38 The court ex-
plained that in Giles39 the supreme court held that whether an insurer
acted in bad faith because it denied or delayed payment of a claim after it
became reasonably clear was a question for the fact-finder. However, in
Williams,40 which was decided the same day, the supreme court held that
where the summary judgment proof conclusively established that there
was no more than a good faith dispute between the parties concerning the
insurer's liability on the contract, bad faith is not shown, and the case may
be decided as a matter of law. Applying these holdings, the court of ap-
peals determined "that unless the summary judgment evidence conclu-
sively established that [the insurer] acted in good faith, i.e., that there was
conclusive evidence of a bona fide dispute on the extent of [the insured's]
injury, the issue presents a question of fact requiring resolution by
trial."'41 Finding that no such conclusive evidence was presented by the
34. Dallas Fire Ins. Co. v. Tex. Contractors Sur. & Cas. Agency, 128 S.W.3d 279, 282-
83 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004), rev'd, 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 200, No. 04-0215, 2004 Tex.
LEXIS 1368 (Tex. Dec. 17, 2004).
35. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. N. Austin Util. Dist. No. 1, 908 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1995).
36. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d at 287-92.
37. Dallas Fire Ins. Co. v. Tex. Contractors Sur. & Cas. Agency, 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 200,
No. 04-0215, 2004 LEXIS 1368, at *1, *5-7 (Tex. Dec. 17, 2004).
38. Covington v. Travelers Indem. Co., 122 S.W.3d 330, 334-35 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003, no pet.).
39. Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 56 (Tex. 1997).
40. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex. 1997).
41. Covington, 122 S.W.3d at 335.
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insurer, the court concluded that questions of material fact remained in
dispute and therefore reversed the grant of summary judgment for the
insurer.42
I. INSURER'S RELIANCE ON AN EXPERT MUST BE REASONABLE
Addressing an insured's extra-contractual claims arising out of the in-
surer's denial of coverage for foundation damage, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals explained that an insurer's reliance on an expert's report,
standing alone, will not necessarily shield the carrier if there is evidence
that the report was not objectively prepared or the insurer's reliance on
the report was unreasonable. However, in that case, there was no evi-
dence that the engineer's investigation was unreliable or that the insurer
acted unreasonably in relying on his investigation in denying the claim.
The court therefore concluded that there was no evidence to support the
jury's finding that the insurer breached the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.43
II. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
1. Whether Any Exception to The "Eight Corners" Rule Exists to
Permit the Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence
During this Survey period, several opinions addressed the ongoing de-
bate concerning whether Texas law recognizes any exception to the strict
"eight corners" rule, under which a court determines an insurer's duty to
defend based on the allegations in the underlying pleadings and the lan-
guage of the insurance policy without resort to extrinsic evidence.
a. Houston Court of Appeals Holds That No Exception Exists
The Houston Court of Appeals weighed in on this issue, holding that
there is no exception to the strict eight corners rule.44 There, the policy
required the insurer to defend any claim arising out of an alleged viola-
tion of any federal, state, or local truth-in-lending or truth-in-leasing law.
The petitions asserted claims for DTPA violations and fraud, but did not
allege that the insureds extended credit in connection with the purchases.
The court determined that the pleadings did not allege facts necessary to
support a cause of action under federal or state truth-in-lending or truth-
in-leasing laws. The insureds argued that the court should create an ex-
ception to the eight corners rule and consider extrinsic evidence to supply
the missing factual allegation that the sales were made on credit. The
court emphasized that the Texas Supreme Court has never recognized an
42. Id.
43. Allstate Tex. Lloyds v. Mason, 123 S.W.3d 690, 703-06 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, no pet.).
44. Landmark Chevrolet Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 121 S.W.3d 886,
888, 890-91 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
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exception to the eight corners rule to permit the introduction of extrane-
ous evidence, and that this court of appeals had already specifically con-
sidered and rejected such an exception.4 5 The court therefore declined to
apply an exception to the eight corners rule.
46
b. Courts Recognizing a Narrow Exception
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals stated that extrinsic evidence is per-
mitted to show no duty to defend only in the following very limited cir-
cumstances: (1) whether a person has been excluded from any coverage;
(2) whether the property in suit has been excluded from any coverage;
and (3) whether the policy exists. Even when extrinsic evidence is al-
lowed, the court may consider only evidence pertaining to coverage and
cannot consider facts pertaining to liability. Further, extrinsic evidence
may not be used to show that the allegations are false. The court deter-
mined that the pleading clearly alleged an occurrence during the policy
period, even though the allegations about the dates of employment may
not have been true, and that fundamental policy coverage was not impli-
cated, because the defendant was a named insured, it was undisputed that
a policy existed, and property was not an issue in the case. The court of
appeals therefore refused to consider any extrinsic evidence.47
In Northfield Insurance Co v. Loving Home Care, Inc.,48 the Fifth Cir-
cuit explained that although the Texas Supreme Court has never recog-
nized any exception to the strict eight corners rule that would allow
courts to examine extrinsic evidence, certain Texas appellate courts, the
Fifth Circuit, and federal district courts in Texas have recognized a nar-
row exception. For example, one line of cases based on the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals' decision in State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Wade4 9 holds that extrinsic evidence can be admitted when the facts al-
leged are insufficient to determine coverage and when doing so does not
question the truth or falsity of any facts alleged in the underlying petition.
The Fifth Circuit, however, noted that no Texas appellate decision has
ever both cited and applied the Wade line of cases. Making an Erie guess,
the Northfield court determined that, "[i]n light of the Texas appellate
courts' unwavering unwillingness to apply and recent repudiations of the
Wade type of exception," the current Texas Supreme Court would not
45. Id. at 890-91 (citing Tri-Coastal Contractors, Inc. v. Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co., 981 S.W.2d 861, 862-64 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)).
46. Id. at 886, 888, 890-91.
47. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church v. Guideone Elite Ins. Co., 139 S.W.3d 384, 387-89
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed); see also Fritz Indus., Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters
Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-894-L, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2638, at *22-23 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
26, 2004) (stating that a court may look at evidence outside the pleadings in circumstances
in which fundamental policy coverage questions are resolved by readily determined facts,
but declining to do so there because the extrinsic evidence referred to by the parties did
not go to a fundamental coverage issue).
48. Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 2004).




recognize any exception to the strict eight corners rule. 50 The court fur-
ther stated, in the unlikely situation the Texas Supreme Court were to
recognize an exception, it would apply only in very limited circumstances,
"when it is initially impossible to discern whether coverage is potentially
implicated and when the extrinsic evidence goes solely to a fundamental
issue of coverage which does not overlap with the merits of or engage the
truth or falsity of any facts alleged in the underlying case." 51
However, in Primrose Operating Co. v. National American Insurance
Co.,52 an opinion issued only a few months after Northfield, the Fifth Cir-
cuit permitted the consideration of extrinsic evidence in circumstances
other than a fundamental issue of coverage. While acknowledging that
under the eight corners rule the duty to defend analysis is not influenced
by facts ascertained before the suit, developed in the process of litigation,
or by the ultimate outcome of the suit, the court expressly stated, "Fact
finders, however, may look to extrinsic evidence if the petition 'does not
contain sufficient facts to enable the court to determine if coverage ex-
ists." 53 Because the claimant "did not specifically allege when the pollu-
tion incidents occurred," it was impossible to determine from the
pleadings alone whether any pollution incident occurred during the policy
period. Therefore, the court concluded that it could look to extrinsic evi-
dence to answer this question. 54
2. Under What Circumstances Will a Conflict of Interest Prevent the
Insurer from Conducting the Defense
The Texas Supreme Court held in Davalos that an insured who rejects
its insurer's defense without a sufficient conflict forfeits its right to re-
cover defense costs. 55 The court explained that the issue of whether an
insurer has the right to conduct its insured's defense is a matter of con-
tract, and that the right to conduct the defense includes the authority to
select the attorney who will defend the claim and to make other decisions
that would normally be vested in the insured as the named party in the
case. However, an insurer may not insist upon its contractual right to
control the defense where a conflict of interest exists between the insurer
and the insured. While the existence or scope of coverage is ordinarily
the basis for a disqualifying conflict, the insured also may rightfully refuse
an inadequate defense and any defense conditioned on an unreasonable,
extra-contractual demand that threatens the insured's independent legal
rights. There, the insured was sued in Dallas County, and his personal
50. Northfield Ins. Co., 363 F.3d at 531.
51. Id.
52. Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 552, 557 (5th Cir.
2004).
53. Id. at 552 (quoting W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. River Entm't, 998 F.2d 311, 313 (5th
Cir. 1993)).
54. Id. at 557.
55. N. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685, 688-90 (Tex. 2004).
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attorneys answered and moved to transfer venue to Matagorda County.56
When notified of the suit, the insurer advised that it wished to substitute
another attorney as defense counsel and that it opposed the motion to
transfer venue. Because of the venue issue, the insured rejected the in-
surer's offered defense. The court determined that had the insured ac-
cepted the defense, he could have submitted the venue issue to the
defense counsel for an independent determination and that the insurer's
actions therefore did not deprive the insured of independent counsel.
Thus, while the insured had the right to reject the insurer's tender and
conduct his own defense, the insured lost his right to recover the costs of
that defense because he rejected the insurer's defense without a sufficient
conflict. The court therefore concluded that the insurer's offer to defend
satisfied its obligation under the policy and that the insurer did not
breach its duty to defend.57
In a case applying Davalos, the Northern District of Texas emphasized
that when the facts to be adjudicated in the liability lawsuit are the same
facts upon which coverage depends, the conflict of interest will prevent
the insurer from conducting the defense. The court determined that be-
cause the liability facts and coverage facts were the same, and because a
potential conflict of interest was created by the insurer's issuance of a
reservation of rights letter, a disqualifying conflict existed and the insurer
could not conduct the defense. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
insured properly refused the insurer's qualified tender of defense and de-
fended the suit on its own and that the insurer was therefore responsible
for the attorney's fees reasonably incurred by the insured in its defense of
the lawsuit. 58
3. Insurer Is Not Required to Pay Pre-Tender Defense Costs
The Northern District of Texas has concluded that an insurer's duty to
defend is not triggered until the insured tenders the suit to the insurer for
a defense and, thus, an insurer is not required to reimburse the insured
for defense costs it incurred prior to the tender of the suit to the insurer.
There, the insureds hired their own counsel to defend them in the under-
lying suit and did not forward the suit papers to the insurer. Although
the attorney for the claimant in the underlying suit contacted the insurer
about the suit, the insureds did not ask the insurer to provide them with a
defense until September 19, 2002, over two years after the suit was filed.
The insurer then paid defense costs incurred after that date and settled
the lawsuit. Nevertheless, the insureds sued the insurer for failure to pay
the fees incurred prior to that date. The court explained that under Texas
law, an insurer's duty to defend its insured is only triggered by the actual
service of process upon its insured and its relay to the insurer, and that
compliance with the notice of suit provision is a condition precedent to
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Hous. Auth. v. Northland Ins. Co., 333 F. Supp. 2d 595, 600-02 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
2005]
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the insurer's liability on the policy. The insured argued that the notice
could come from any source and that the insurers received notice of the
litigation by the demand letters sent by the claimant's attorney. The
court rejected this argument, emphasizing that it is the action by the in-
sured in sending the suit papers to the insurer that triggers the insurer's
obligation to tender a defense and answer the suit, and that the insurers
were entitled to rely on the fact that the insureds were represented by
counsel and surely would have made a demand for defense and indemni-
fication if they wanted the insurers to be involved. Therefore, the court
concluded as a matter of law that the insurers did not owe the insureds a
duty to reimburse them for expenses incurred in violation of the volun-
tary payments clause. 59
4. Insurer Was Not Estopped from Denying Coverage for Individual
Where Insurer Did Not Undertake Defense of
That Individual
The Amarillo Court of Appeals in Tull addressed whether an insurer
had waived or was estopped from asserting its policy defenses.60 There,
members of the Tull family sustained injuries when their vehicle was
struck by the vehicle driven by Melissa Shaffer ("Shaffer") and owned by
her employer, Chase Portable X-Ray of Texas, Inc. ("Chase"). Chase no-
tified its insurer, Federal Insurance Company ("Federal"), which paid the
Tulls' property damage claim. The Tulls then sued Shaffer for their per-
sonal injuries. Although Chase was not named as a defendant in the suit,
Federal hired an attorney to defend Chase. The attorney obtained medi-
cal bills from the Tulls' attorney and confirmed that he did not need to
file an answer at that point. Federal also sent a reservation of rights letter
to Shaffer stating that a default judgment was probable if she did not file
an answer and advising her of its position that the Chase policy did not
provide coverage for her. After obtaining a default judgment against
Shaffer, the Tulls sued Federal and their own insurer, which argued that
Federal was estopped from denying coverage for Shaffer. 61
The court of appeals explained that an insurer undertaking or continu-
ing the defense of a claim without an effective reservation of rights, while
having knowledge of facts indicating the claim is not covered, may waive
or be estopped from asserting policy defenses. However, this rule is pre-
mised on the insurer's assumption of the defense of the underlying suit.
59. L'Atrium on the Creek I, L.P. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 787,
790-93 (N.D. Tex. 2004); see also Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Nucentrix Broadband Net-
works, Inc., 309 B.R. 907 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (determining that based on the language
of the policy, the insurer's authorization and approval of an expense was required prior to
the expense being incurred for the expense to qualify as a covered "claim expense"; thus,
because the insured did not obtain such authorization and approval, the insurer was not
liable for attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the suit prior to the date that the
insured gave notice to the insurer).
60. Tull v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 146 S.W.3d 689, 694-95 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2004, no pet.).
61. Id. at 691-93.
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The court found that the attorney retained by Federal did not file an an-
swer or otherwise appear in the lawsuit on behalf of Shaffer, and that
neither the attorney's communications with the Tulls' attorney, nor Fed-
eral's payment of the property damage claim and offer to settle the per-
sonal injury claims, were evidence that Federal undertook or exercised
control over Shaffer's defense. The court therefore concluded that Fed-
eral had not waived and was not estopped from asserting its coverage
defenses. 62
5. Section 16.071 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Does
Not Void a Notice Provision in an Insurance Policy
The Northern District of Texas63 has rejected a novel argument by an
insured that the provision of the policy requiring it to give the insurer
prompt notice of loss or damage was void based on section 16.071(a) of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides that a con-
tract stipulation that requires a claimant to give notice of a claim for dam-
ages as a condition precedent to the right to sue on the contract is not
valid unless the stipulation is reasonable and that a stipulation that re-
quires notification within less than ninety days is void. 64 Making an Erie
guess on the issue, the court concluded that the Texas Supreme Court, if
directly confronted with the issue, would hold that the notice provisions
in the policy do not pertain to a "claim for damages," but merely are
requirements that the insured give the insurer notice of a potentially cov-
ered event so that the insurer can promptly conduct an investigation of
the event, and that the policy's notice provisions therefore are not af-
fected by section 16.071(a). Then, addressing whether the insured com-
plied with the notice provisions, the court explained that Texas law
interprets "prompt notice" and "as soon as possible" language as requir-
ing notice within a reasonable time from the occurrence of the event
causing the loss or damage. There, the insured claimed damage from a
hailstorm in 1995, but did not give the insurer notice of the loss until
2001. The court found that if the insured actually sustained the amount
of damage it claimed, it could and should have discovered the damage
within a few months after the storm occurred. Thus, the court deter-
mined that no rational finder of fact could conclude that the insured gave
notice within a reasonable time and that the insurer was therefore enti-
tled to summary judgment. 65
62. Id. at 694-95.
63. Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 2d 851, 857 (N.D.
Tex. 2004).
64. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.071(a) (Vernon 1997).




1. The "Occurrence" Debate
As in the last Survey, insurers, insureds, and courts continue to struggle
in determining whether allegations meet the "occurrence" requirement of
general liability policies, particularly in the context of construction defect
claims. Federal and state courts recently weighed in on both sides of this
issue. Until the Texas Supreme Court addresses this issue, it will continue
to present difficulties.
a. Claims for Negligence Allege an "Occurrence"
The Dallas Court of Appeals examined this issue in depth in Gehan
Homes, holding that the construction defect claims did allege an "occur-
rence," thus triggering the duty to defend under the CGL policy.66 The
plaintiffs sued their home builder for construction defects, asserting
causes of action for negligence, breach of contract and warranty, DTPA
violations, and fraud. The builder sought coverage under policies con-
taining the standard CGL policy language defining an "occurrence" as an
"accident." The court explained that two lines of cases defining the term
occurrence have evolved in Texas. The first line of cases is derived from
the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Maupin and pertains to coverage
of claims against an insured for damage caused by its alleged intentional
torts.67 The second line of cases is derived from the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Orkin which construed the term accident "to include
negligent acts of the insured causing damage which is undesigned and
unexpected. '68 Following Orkin, both state and federal courts in Texas
have interpreted the terms accident and occurrence to include damage
that is the unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or conse-
quence of an insured's negligent behavior. Given these two lines of cases,
Texas courts have split on the issue in construction defect cases, with
some holding that there was an occurrence where the allegation was of
defective workmanship, and others holding that such claims do not allege
an occurrence.
69
The builder contended that the underlying lawsuit alleged an occur-
rence because the plaintiffs pleaded that the builder was negligent. Con-
versely, the insurers contended that there was no occurrence because the
claims were based on an underlying contract, the construction was a vol-
untary and deliberate act, and the injury was to the subject of the con-
tract. The court of appeals emphasized that acceptance of the insurers'
position would require the court to ignore the negligence allegations,
which were more than simply bare-bones allegations. While recognizing
66. Gehan Homes, Ltd. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 146 S.W.3d 833, 837, 843 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
67. Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1973).
68. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 416 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex.
1967).
69. Gehan Homes, 146 S.W.3d at 839-41.
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that some courts have found no occurrence where the claimed damage is
to the subject of the contract, the court stated that it agreed with the cases
holding that negligence that results in damage to the subject of the con-
tract constitutes an occurrence because the relevant inquiry is not
whether the insured damaged his own work, but whether the resulting
damage was unexpected and unintended. The court determined that the
intentional act of performing the contract was allegedly performed negli-
gently and that the purported damage was an unexpected and undesigned
consequence of the builder's alleged negligence. The court therefore con-
cluded that the insurers did not establish as a matter of law that the peti-
tion did not allege an occurrence. 70
b. Claims That the Insured Failed to Meet Its Contractual
Obligations Do Not Allege an "Occurrence"
The Northern District of Texas has recently stated in Tealwood that it is
aware of, and agrees with, the line of cases holding that construction de-
fect claims arising from negligent work allege an occurrence. 71 However,
the court found the case before it to be different because the petition did
not involve claims of construction defects and included only bare-bone
allegations of negligence. The court emphasized that the mere allegation
of negligence does not control the issue of the duty to defend; rather, the
focus is on the factual allegations that show the origin of the damages, not
on the legal theories alleged. There, the plaintiff's real complaint was
that the insured did not live up to its contractual obligation. The court
concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to
the existence of an "occurrence" and that the insurer was therefore enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law. 72
The Western District of Texas noted that it had previously concluded
that an "underlying petition that factually alleges deficient and substan-
dard construction, regardless of the legal theories it asserts, fails to allege
an 'accident' or therefore an 'occurrence' and, consequently, does not
give rise to the duty to defend on the part of the construction companies'
CGL insurers."' 73 The underlying lawsuit complained about the insureds'
performance of their contractual and warranty obligations and that the
insureds negligently landscaped and excavated, resulting in damage to the
70. Id. at 842-43; see also Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas v. Interstate Fire & Cas.
Co., 133 S.W.3d 887, 894-95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (in a case arising from a
priest's alleged sexual molestation of a child, the court determined that the plaintiff could
prevail on its negligent hiring and negligent supervision claims without a showing that the
Diocese actually knew about the priest's sexual propensities; and that if the Diocese did
not know of the priest's sexual propensities, then the priest's conduct was both unexpected
and unintentional from the standpoint of the insured and, therefore, a judgment for the
plaintiff could fall within coverage).
71. Tealwood Constr., Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-2159-L, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20993 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2003).
72. Id. at *13-20.
73. Mid Arc, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. A-03-CA-242-55, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7498, at *9-10 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2004) (citing Vesta Fire Ins. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins.
Co., No. A-00-CA-468-55, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25324 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2003)).
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property. The court determined that the insured was seeking coverage
for its own faulty work, i.e. for performing its duties negligently, resulting
in damage to the insured's own work or product as opposed to something
other than the insured's own work or product. Following its prior hold-
ing, the court concluded that these allegations did not constitute allega-
tions of an "occurrence. '74
2. The Business Risk Exclusions
a. The "Property Damage" Exclusion
The "property damage" exclusion of the standard CGL policy excludes
coverage for property damage to that particular part of real property on
which the insured, or any contractors or subcontractors working directly
or indirectly on the insured's behalf, is performing operations, if the prop-
erty damage arises out of those operations. However, the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas has explained that allegations that the insured's work
caused damage to property other than that on which the insured worked
fall outside the scope of this exclusion. 75
b. The "Your Product" and "Your Work" Exclusions
The Fifth Circuit has determined that the "your product" exclusion in a
standard CGL policy is not ambiguous. There, the insurers argued that
any "property damage" alleged in the underlying lawsuit fell within the
"your product" exclusion. The plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit, now the
judgment creditor of the insured, sued the insurers, urging that the defini-
tion of "products-completed operations hazard" conflicted with the "your
product" exclusion. Specifically, while the "your product" exclusion re-
moved coverage for "property damage" to the insured's product arising
from its product, the "products-complete operations hazard" appeared to
extend coverage to "property damage" arising out of the insured's prod-
uct, as long as the damage occurred off the insured's premises and not
while the insured still had physical possession of its product. The district
court accepted this argument, concluding that the "your product" exclu-
sion and the "product-completed operations hazard" definition, when
read together with the "Products-Completed Operations Aggregate
Limit" potentially created an ambiguity, and that the ambiguity should be
construed in favor of coverage such that the "your product" exclusion
was not enforceable. 76
The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded, after reading these three provi-
sions within the context of the policy as a whole, that the district court
erred in finding a conflict among the provisions. The court explained that
the "your product" exclusion was included in the "Section I-Coverages"
74. Id. at *20-21.
75. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Knox Park Constr., Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:01-CV-1852-K, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19937, *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2003).




section. Thus, "Section I-Coverages" is where coverage is both granted
as to damages because of "property damage" caused by an "occurrence"
and then limited by exclusions such as the "your product" exclusion. The
court determined that the district court incorrectly assumed that the
"Products-Completed Operations Aggregate Limit" in "Section III-
Limits of Insurance" functioned to grant coverage; rather, this section
simply explained the amount of damages the policy will cover. Read to-
gether with the definition of "products-completed operations hazard," it
delineated the declared limits of the insurance for off-premises "property
damage" arising from the insured's product. 77
The court determined that, because the "Products-Completed Opera-
tions Aggregate Limit" provision did not separately grant "products-
completed operations hazard" coverage, there was no discord with the
"your product" exclusion and the three clauses could easily be read to-
gether without conflict. Specifically, Section I of the policy grants broad
coverage of damages due to "property damage"; the Section I "your
product" exclusion limits that coverage, and Section III sets out limits on
the amount of coverage the insurers will pay, depending on the location
of the damage. The court found that the "your product" exclusion is sus-
ceptible to only one reasonable interpretation and can be given definite
meaning within the policy as a whole and, therefore, is unambiguous as a
matter of law. Then applying a plain reading of the "your product" exclu-
sion, the court concluded that it barred coverage for "property damage"
to the insured's product arising from the insured's representations made
with respect to the quality of its product, regardless of the location where
such "property damage" occurred.78
c. The "Impaired Property" Exclusion
The "impaired property exclusion" in a standard CGL policy excludes
coverage for property damage to impaired property arising out of a de-
fect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in "your product" or
"your work." Impaired property is defined as tangible property other
than "your product" or "your work" that cannot be used or is less useful.
The petition at issue alleged damages to a building caused by the insured
or its subcontractors who constructed the building. The court determined
77. Id. at 775-76.
78. Id. at 776; see also Fritz Indus., Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.
3:02-CV-894 L, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2638, at *14-16, *24-27 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2004)
(finding that the petitions failed to allege any facts which could be reasonably construed to
allege physical damage to tangible property other than the tile installed by the insured and
that the "your product" exclusion therefore barred coverage); Vogelbusch USA, Inc. v.
State Farm Lloyds, No. 14-03-00700-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6157, at *11, *18-19 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 13, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (con-
cluding that the "your product" and "your work" exclusions were unambiguous and ex-
cluded coverage if the alleged property damage was allegedly caused by a product that the
insured no longer possessed or by work the insured had completed, and that allegations
that damage to the system occurred after the insured had transferred possession of the
system to the owner and after the insured had completed its work clearly fell within the
"your product" and "your work" exclusions).
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that because the building constituted the insured's work, the building was
not included in the definition of impaired property and, therefore, the
exclusion did not apply.79
3. Texas Supreme Court Reiterates that "Arising out of' Language
Requires Only But-For Causation, Not Proximate Causation
In construing language in a policy that excluded coverage for injury
"due to" the rendition of professional services, the supreme court con-
trasted this language with other policy exclusions which were drawn more
broadly to exclude harm "arising out of" conduct instead of "due to" that
conduct. The court explained that it has held that "arise out of" means
that there is simply a causal connection or relation, which is interpreted
to mean that there is but-for causation, though not necessarily direct or
proximate causation. Further, other jurisdictions also interpret "arising
out of" to exclude a proximate cause requirement, and the Fifth Circuit
has concluded that "arising out of" are words of much broader signifi-
cance than "caused by." Accordingly, the court concluded that because
the policy used different wording in parallel exclusions, the phrases
should have different meanings, and, therefore, "due to" requires a more
direct type of causation that could tie the insured's liability to the manner
in which the services were performed.80 Given the frequency with which
the language "arising out of" is used in policies, this decision is significant
for its insight concerning how the supreme court interprets such language.
4. Where the Named Insured Is a Sole Proprietorship, the Auto
Exclusion Extends to Autos Owned by the Sole Proprietor
The Houston Court of Appeals addressed the following issue of appar-
ent first impression under Texas law: if an individual obtains an insurance
policy under which the named insured is that individual doing business
under another name, does a policy provision excluding coverage for auto-
mobiles owned by the named insured exclude coverage as to an automo-
bile owned by that individual in his own name? The CGL policy at issue
excluded coverage for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
ownership of any auto owned by any insured. The court determined that
the provision was unambiguous. Relying on cases holding that a sole pro-
prietorship has no separate legal existence apart from the sole proprietor,
the court concluded that the sole proprietorship and its proprietor were
one and the same for purposes of the CGL policy, and that the exclusion
for vehicles owned by the named insured therefore applied to preclude
coverage. 81
79. Amerisure Ins. Co. v. ML & Assocs., Inc., 302 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2003).
80. Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 202-03 (Tex. 2004) (op. on
reh'g).
81. CU Lloyd's of Tex. v. Hatfield, 126 S.W.3d 679, 680, 684-86 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
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5. Additional Insured Endorsement
Global Sun Pools, Inc. d/b/a The Pool Depot ("Global") built an
above-ground swimming pool for the plaintiffs and was sued by the plain-
tiffs. Paul Simmons ("Simmons"), the man who actually constructed the
pool, had a policy with Burlington Insurance Company ("Burlington").
The policy showed Simmons as the named insured engaged in the busi-
ness of installing above-ground swimming pools, and an endorsement
named Global as an additional insured with respect to liability arising out
of Simmons's operations or premises owned by or rented to Simmons.
Global tendered the lawsuit to Burlington for defense and indemnity.
Burlington denied coverage on the ground that nothing in the pleadings
showed that the plaintiffs' claims arose out of Simmons's operations, the
petition did not create any potential for coverage. The court of appeals,
however, seized on a reference in the pleading to Global and "its build-
ers," and concluded that this broad, general statement was sufficient to
trigger Burlington's defense obligations under the additional insured
endorsement. 82
C. AUTO POLICIES
1. Texas Supreme Court Holds That the Spouse of the Named Insured
Can Reject UM and PIP Coverages
The Texas Supreme Court held that the insured spouse of the person
identified as the named insured in the declarations of an auto policy falls
within the class of persons statutorily entitled to reject UM and PIP cov-
erages.83 There, the wife applied for and purchased the policy and re-
jected the UM and PIP coverages. Although the wife's name appeared
on the application, she was not listed as a "named insured" on the decla-
rations page. However, because the policy defined "you" and "your" to
include the "named insured" and the spouse if a resident of the same
household, the wife was an insured under the policy. While the husband
was lying beneath his truck making repairs, the truck was struck by a
vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist, and the husband sought UM
coverage. The applicable statutes contain "two pertinent phrases regard-
ing who may reject UM and PIP coverages: (1) 'any insured named in the
policy;' and (2) 'the named insured." 84 Based on legislative history, the
court determined that "insured named in the policy" was synonymous
with "named insured." Then addressing the meaning of "named in-
sured," the court explained that the standard automobile policy form in
use at the time the statutes were enacted defined "named insured" to
include both the individual named in the declarations and that individ-
82. Global Sun Pools, Inc. v. Burlington Ins. Co., No. 05-03-00765-CV, 2004 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7552, at *2, *5-6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 23, 2004, no pet.).
83. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 111, 112, 119 (Tex.
2004).




ual's spouse if a resident of the same household. Thus, when the legisla-
ture chose the phrase "named insured," it must have intended it to
include the named insured's resident spouse. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the wife could be classified as a "named insured" and thus an
"insured named in the policy." The court held that the wife had statutory
authority to reject UM and PIP coverages and rendered judgment for the
insurer.85
2. Texas Supreme Court Interprets the Term "Motor Vehicle Accident"
The Texas Supreme Court interpreted the term "motor vehicle acci-
dent" as used in the PIP coverage section of the standard Texas automo-
bile policy.86 There, the insured was injured when his foot became
entangled with the raised portion of his truck door while he was exiting
the vehicle. The insured sought PIP benefits under his auto policy, which
provided that the insurer would pay PIP benefits because of bodily injury
resulting from a "motor vehicle accident" and sustained by a covered per-
son. The court emphasized that while the term "motor vehicle accident"
does not require a collision or near collision, the vehicle must be more
than the mere situs of the accident or injury-producing event; rather, the
automobile must, in some manner, be involved in the accident. Accord-
ingly, the court held that a "motor vehicle accident" occurs when: (1) one
or more vehicles are involved with another vehicle, an object, or a person;
(2) the vehicle is being used, including exit and entry, as a motor vehicle;
and (3) a causal connection exists between the vehicle's use and the in-
jury-producing event. Applying this standard, the court concluded that
the insured's injury resulted from a "motor vehicle accident" within the
policy's PIP coverage. 87
3. Courts Interpret the Term "Occupying"
The Dallas Court of Appeals interpreted the term "occupying" under
the UIM coverage section of an auto policy, which defined an insured as
anyone occupying a covered vehicle, and defined "occupying" as "in,
upon, getting in, on, out or off." 88 There, the claimant, a passenger in
Vehicle 1, was ejected from the vehicle when it skidded off the road.
While the claimant was outside Vehicle 1, Vehicle 2 skidded off the road
and struck the claimant. After receiving the limits of the liability policy
for Vehicle 2, the claimant sought UIM benefits under the policy for Ve-
hicle 1. The court noted that other Texas courts have considered the
"getting in, on, out or off" language and the language is not ambiguous.
Courts interpreting this language in the context of an injury that occurred
outside of the covered vehicle have looked at whether there was a causal
85. Id. at 115-19.
86. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sturrock, 146 S.W.3d 123, 124-25 (Tex. 2004).
87. Id. at 127-34.




connection between the incident that caused the injury and the covered
vehicle. Applying this standard, the court emphasized that the claimant
stated he was walking toward another vehicle when he was struck and
produced no evidence showing how long he had been out of Vehicle 1
before being struck or that his injuries were related to any impact with
Vehicle 1. Accordingly, the court found there was no causal connection
between the claimant's injuries and Vehicle 1 and, therefore, that the
claimant was not "occupying" Vehicle 1 and thus was not an insured
under the policy covering Vehicle 1.89
4. A Material Deviation from the Permission to Use the Auto
Precludes Coverage under the Omnibus Clause
The Texas Supreme Court in Renfro addressed whether an employee
has implied permission to use a company truck at the time of the accident
so as to be covered under the "omnibus clause" of a commercial auto
liability policy that insured an employer and "anyone else while using
with your [the employer's] permission a covered auto."90 The employee
worked for a business in Bridgeport. One Friday night, the owner of the
business let the employee take a company truck home, which was about
half a mile away, because it was company policy to let an employee take a
company truck home overnight when he had to be at a site early the next
morning. The employee drove the truck to a friend's home and then
drove forty miles away to Saginaw; on the return trip, a collision occurred
in which the friend was killed. The employee testified that he knew he
did not have permission to take the truck to the friend's home or to Sagi-
naw. The rule in Texas is that a person may deviate from the permitted
usage of an insured vehicle and still be covered under an omnibus provi-
sion if the use is not a material or gross violation of the terms if the initial
permission. The supreme court determined that the employee's trip to
Saginaw was, as a matter of law, a material deviation from any implied
permission he may have had to use the vehicle in Bridgeport, and that the
employee therefore was not covered under the omnibus clause of the
company's policy.91
5. An Insured Who Accepts Actual Cash Value for a Totaled Vehicle
Must Assign the Title to the Vehicle to the Insurer
In Hamby, the insured, on behalf of himself and other similarly situ-
ated persons, sued State Farm challenging State Farm's right to require
89. Id. at 309-10; see also Ins. Co. of the State of Penn. v. Pearson, No. 07-03-0340-CV,
2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8155, at *2, *5-9 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Sept. 7, 2004, no pet.) (fol-
lowing McKiddy and concluding that, where claimant was struck by a taxi while standing
outside a parked truck and performing work in the emergency lane of the interstate, there
was no evidence of a nexus, or conjunction of time, place, purpose, and act, between the
truck and the injuries, and therefore, the claimant was not "occupying" the truck and thus
was not an insured under the policy).
90. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Renfrow, 130 S.W.3d 70, 71 (Tex. 2004).
91. Id. at 71-73.
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the insured to assign it title to a totaled vehicle in order for the insured to
receive payment for the vehicle's actual cash value.92 The "Payment of
Loss" provision of the policy provided that State Farm may pay for loss in
money or repair or replace the damaged or stolen property; that State
Farm may return any stolen property and that it would pay for any dam-
age resulting from the theft; and that State Farm "may keep all or part of
the property at an agreed or appraised value." The insured contended
that the last clause applied only if the car had been stolen. The court,
however, determined that based on the plain language of the provision, it
was not reasonable to conclude that because the next-to-last sentence
mentions only stolen cars, the last sentence only applies to stolen cars.
Instead, the court held as a matter of law that the provision as a whole
and the last sentence in particular applied to both stolen and damaged
cars. Because the insured chose the higher actual cash value amount
(rather than the option of accepting the actual cash value minus the sal-
vage value and keeping the car himself), the insured was required to turn
the vehicle and its title over to State Farm.93
D. HOMEOWNERS POLICIES
1. Fifth Circuit Certifies the Ensuing Loss Issue to Texas Supreme
Court
Texas state and federal courts have reached conflicting results in decid-
ing whether coverage exists for mold claims under the ensuing loss provi-
sion of the standard Texas Homeowners Form B (HO-B) policy, which
states, "We do not cover loss caused by: ... rust, rot, mold or other fungi
.... We do cover ensuing loss caused by collapse of building or any part
of the building, water damage . .. if the loss would otherwise be covered
under this policy."'94 The Fifth Circuit explained that "cases that have
addressed the issue of the proper interpretation of the ensuing loss provi-
sion can be grouped into two categories: those that would extend cover-
age for mold resulting or ensuing from covered water damage, and those
that would not."'95 Cases that would extend coverage for mold contami-
nation "ensuing" from covered water damage interpret the ensuing loss
provision as an exception to the exclusion for "rust, rot, mold or other
fungi." Under this interpretation, mold contamination that results or en-
sues from a covered water damage event (e.g., a bursting pipe releasing
water into a house) is covered notwithstanding the exclusionary language
specifically denying coverage for mold. However, if mold contamination
results from a water event that is not covered under the policy (e.g., natu-
rally occurring water condensation accumulating in an inadequately
92. Hamby v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 137 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
93. Id. at 835-37.





vented crawl space), coverage must be denied under the general mold
exclusion.96
Conversely, cases that would deny coverage for mold contamination
caused by a covered water event interpret the ensuing loss provision not
as an exception to the mold exclusion, but rather as a type of "savings
clause" intended to safeguard otherwise covered losses from an overly
expansive construction of the policy exclusions. These cases read the en-
suing loss provision as requiring, in essence, a preceding cause, a proxi-
mate cause, and an ensuing loss. The preceding cause must be one of the
types of damage enumerated in the exclusion, including rust, rot, mold, or
other fungi. The proximate cause, in turn, must be one of the forms of
damage listed in the ensuing loss provision, including otherwise covered
water damage. Finally, a loss must occur as a result of the proximate
cause.
97
The Fifth Circuit found that these two interpretations of the ensuing
loss provision are irreconcilable and therefore certified the following
question to the Texas Supreme Court: "Does the ensuing loss provision
contained in Section I-Exclusions, part 1(f) of the Homeowners Form B
(HO-B) insurance policy as prescribed by the Texas Department of Insur-
ance effective July 8, 1992 (Revised January 1, 1996), when read in con-
junction with the remainder of the policy, provide coverage for mold
contamination caused by water damage that is otherwise covered under
the policy?" 98
2. HOB-T Policy Provides Coverage for Mold Damage
As an issue of first impression, the Houston Court of Appeals con-
cluded that coverage existed under a Texas Homeowners Form B-T pol-
icy (HOB-T) for mold damage caused by a leaking air conditioner. The
"Perils Insured Against" section of the policy stated the insurer would
insure against physical property to a listed peril unless the loss was specif-
ically excluded. One of the perils listed was accidental discharge, leak-
age, or overflow of water or steam from within a plumbing, heating, or air
conditioning system or household appliance. The insured contended that
the air conditioning system leaked and caused mold to spread throughout
her apartment and damage her personal belongings. Conversely, the in-
surer argued that because a named-perils policy excludes all risks not spe-
cifically included in the policy, and because mold was not a named peril in
the policy, mold was excluded from coverage. Rejecting this argument,
the court stated that it did not share the insurer's narrow view and instead
found that, depending on the circumstances, mold can be either damage
or a cause of loss. The court determined that, applying the plain meaning
of the policy language, the policy covers tangible damage to personal
property by water leaking from an air conditioning unit and that such
96. Id. at 810.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 811-12.
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leaks can produce mold damage, which is a tangible loss to the personal
property. The court therefore concluded that the policy language was un-
ambiguous and required payment for mold damage caused by a leaking
air conditioning unit.99
3. When Insurer and Insured Both Offer Expert Testimony as to
Disputed Coverage Issue, It Is Up to the Jury to Resolve the
Dispute
The homeowners policy at issue excluded coverage for foundation
damage, unless it was caused by a plumbing leak. Based on a report from
an engineer concluding that the foundation damage was not caused by a
plumbing leak, the insurer denied the claim, and the insureds sued. At
trial, the insured offered expert testimony that the foundation damage
was caused by a plumbing leak, while the insurer offered expert testi-
mony that the foundation damage was caused by soil movement. The
court of appeals concluded that with competing contentions supported by
expert witnesses on both sides, the burden fell to the jury to determine
which contention was more credible. Thus, the court concluded that the
evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's findings
that the foundation damage was caused by a plumbing leak and that the
insurer breached the policy. 100
E. DIRECTOR & OFFICER AND PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY POLICIES
1. The Personal Profit Exclusion
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the scope of the personal profit exclusion
in a director and officer liability policy which excluded coverage for any
claim based upon, arising from, or in consequence of an insured having
gained any personal profit, remuneration, or advantage to which such in-
sured was not legally entitled. There, investors sued the company, its for-
mer CEO, several other of its directors and officers, and a securities
dealer representing the company, alleging that the CEO and the securi-
ties dealer solicited them to invest in the company by making misrepre-
sentations. Analyzing whether the personal profit exclusion applied to
the CEO, who was also the majority shareholder and chairman of the
startup company, the court explained it had previously found that a ma-
jority shareholder in a small startup company gains a personal advantage
from a sizeable capital investment in the company because it gives the
majority shareholder the opportunity to become the owner of a successful
business. Thus, the court determined that the CEO gained a personal
advantage from the opportunity to own and participate in a successful
business when the company was infused with capital as a result of his
fraud. A defendant is not legally entitled to an advantage or profit result-
99. DeLaurentis v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, No. 14-03-00164-CV, 2004 Tex. App.
LEXIS 8758, at *2, *14-22 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2004, no pet.).
100. Allstate Tex. Lloyds v. Mason, 123 S.W.3d 690, 694, 700-03 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003, no pet.).
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ing from his violation of law if he could be required to return such profit.
Because return of the capital investment in the company could have been
required, the court determined there was no legal entitlement to the capi-
tal investment and that the CEO was not legally entitled to profit from
his fraud. 10 '
The claimants then contended that even if the exclusion applied to the
CEO, it should not apply to the company or the other directors and of-
ficers. Finding that this contention was contrary to the plain language of
the exclusion, the court explained that the exclusion did not use language
requiring that the insured against whom the claim is asserted be the same
insured who gained the profit (i.e., "the insured," "that insured," or "such
insured"). Rather, the exclusion used the more general term "an in-
sured," thus indicating that coverage is excluded for all insureds, not
merely the insured who profited. The court therefore concluded that the
personal profit exclusion barred coverage for the CEO, the securities
dealer, the other directors and officers, and the company.
102
2. Court Interprets "Related" as Having a Logical or Causal
Connection
As an issue of first impression, the Houston Court of Appeals inter-
preted the term "related" in a medical malpractice policy. The policy at
issue provided that the limit of liability stated in the policy for each claim
was the limit of the insurer's liability for all injury or damage arising out
of, or in connection with, the same or related medical incident. In the
absence of a definition in the policy, the court found that the term "re-
lated" should be given its plain, ordinary, and generally accepted mean-
ing of "having a logical or causal connection." 10 3 Although the
underlying lawsuit contained allegations against two doctors, the court
found that all the medical incidents at issue involved the same patient, at
the same facility, during the same period of time, with regard to the same
x-ray, and led to a single result that formed the basis of the lawsuit.
1°4
Thus, the court held that the medical incidents were related and, there-
fore, the insurer's total liability was limited to a single "per loss event"
limit of liability. 10 5
F. FORTUITY DOCTRINE, KNOWN Loss RULE, AND Loss IN
PROGRESS RULE
The Fifth Circuit recently applied the principle of Texas insurance law
known as the fortuity doctrine, the known loss rule, or the loss in progress
rule. Because the purpose of insurance is to protect insureds against un-
101. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. v. Pinkmonkey.com, Inc., 375 F.3d 365, 370-71 (5th Cir.
2004).
102. Id. at 371-73.
103. Columbia Cas. Co. v. CP Nat'l, Inc., No. 01-00-01406-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS
8362, at *18 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 16, 2004, no pet.).
104. Id. at *21.
105. Id. at *9-10, *17-21.
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known or fortuitous risks, fortuity is an inherent requirement of all risk
insurance policies. The fortuity doctrine holds that insurance coverage is
precluded where the insured is or should be aware of an ongoing progres-
sive or known loss at the time it purchased the policy. When determining
coverage under the fortuity doctrine, the key inquiry is not whether the
insured actually knew of the underlying loss or potential liability, but
rather whether it knew, at the inception of coverage, that they were en-
gaging in activities which might reasonably be expected to expose them to
or result in liability. The court rejected the insured's argument that the
fortuity doctrine requires some sort of "watershed event," such as the
receipt of a demand or the filing of a lawsuit, to give the insured sufficient
notice that it is subject to potential liability, instead holding that the court
considers whether the party knowingly acted in a manner in which it
could possibly be found liable. Applying these principles, the court held
that the fortuity doctrine barred coverage, where the alleged price dis-
crimination that led to the underlying antitrust suit began four years prior
to the purchase of the policy and the petition alleged that the insured
intentionally and knowingly engaged in the price discrimination.10 6
G. INSURED'S DUTY TO MITIGATE
The Fifth Circuit has reiterated that an insured owes its insurer an im-
plied duty to mitigate liability to the insurer. There, the plaintiff sued the
insured for injuries sustained at the insured's store. The insured did not
notify the insurer of the suit until over five years after the original injury
and over three years after the suit was filed, and informed the insurer that
it did not intend to defend itself against the lawsuit. The excess policy at
issue expressly stated that it did not apply to defense, and the insurer
therefore had no duty to provide a defense to the insured. The insured
did not appear at trial, and a default judgment was entered against it.
The court determined that the insured had a duty to take some action to
mitigate liability and damages arising out of the suit, but that the insured
deliberately decided not to take any action. The court concluded that
such inaction constituted a breach of the insured's duty to mitigate owed
to its insurer, thus relieving the insurer of any obligation to pay the de-
fault judgment.10 7
106. RLI Ins. Co. v. Maxxon Southwest Inc., 108 Fed. Appx. 194, 198-200 (5th Cir.
2004); see also Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.SA-04-CV-251-XR, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19797, at *13-18 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2004) (determining that because the
allegations in the underlying lawsuit outlined facts, transactions, or events which were or
reasonably would be regarded as wrongful employment practices that took place prior to
the inception of the policy, coverage for the lawsuit was barred by the policy's prior knowl-
edge exclusion and the fortuity doctrine). Cf. Burlington Ins. Co. v. Tex. Krishnas, Inc.,
143 S.W.3d 226, 230-31 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, no pet.) (setting forth the same legal
standards, but declining to hold that the duty to defend was precluded by the fortuity
doctrine under the facts of that case, because the underlying lawsuits did not plead when
any specific event took place or whether the insured either knew or should have known of
the loss or of an ongoing progressive loss at the time the policy was issued).




H. COVERAGE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The article for the last Survey period included an opinion issued by a
panel of the Fort Worth Court of Appeals holding that punitive damages
were covered under a liability policy and that such coverage did not vio-
late public policy. 10 8 Subsequently, the court of appeals sitting en banc
granted rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a new opin-
ion. 10 9 The insurer argued that punitive damages were not covered be-
cause they were based on conduct that results in expected or intended
injuries, and the CGL portion of the policy provided coverage only for an
occurrence, defined as an accident which results in bodily injury neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. However, the
policy also contained a hospital professional liability portion which did
not limit coverage to only an accident or occurrence. Because the dam-
ages would have been covered under this portion of the policy, the court
determined that the policy did not preclude coverage for punitive
damages. 110
The court then addressed whether coverage for punitive damage vio-
lates Texas public policy. Noting that neither the legislature nor the su-
preme court has addressed the public policy implications of insurance
coverage for punitive damage awards against nursing homes, the court
examined the history of punitive damages in Texas and cases regarding
coverage for punitive damages in other contexts. The court ultimately
concluded that it could not say that coverage for punitive damages under
the policy was void as against public policy at the times of the issuance of
the policy in 1993, the occurrence in 1994, and the suit and settlement in
1995. However, the court emphasized that public policy is "not static and
is subject to change" and that it was not addressing the present viability
of insured punitive damages.1"
The Northern District of Texas has also held that the expected or in-
tended injury exclusion does not bar coverage for punitive damages
based on grossly negligent conduct, and that Texas public policy does not
preclude coverage for punitive damages. 112 The debate on this issue will
likely continue until it is squarely addressed by the Texas Supreme Court.
Fortunately, the court will have the opportunity to do so, as the Fifth
Circuit has certified the following question to it: "Does Texas public pol-
icy prohibit a liability insurance provider from indemnifying an award for
punitive damages imposed on its insured because of gross negligence?'
' 113
108. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 2-01-227-CV, 2003 Tex. App.
LEXIS 5468 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 26, 2003, no pet.).
109. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 152 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2004, pet. filed) (en banc) (op. on reh'g).
110. Id. at 181-82.
111. Id. at 182-91.
112. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Stebbins Five Cos., No. CIV.A. 302CV1279M, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6374, at *13, *18 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2004).




A. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT GRANTS MANDAMUS RELIEF TO
ENFORCE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN
INSURANCE POLICIES
As an issue of first impression for the court, the Texas Supreme Court
held that a forum selection clause in an insurance policy is enforceable
and that mandamus relief is the appropriate remedy for a trial court's
improper refusal to enforce a forum selection clause. 114 The supreme
court explained that although forum selection clauses were once disfa-
vored by American courts, the United States Supreme Court has since
held that a forum selection clause should be enforced unless the party
opposing it can clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable
and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or
overreaching. A clause may come within these exceptions if enforcement
would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit was
brought, or when the contractually selected forum would be seriously in-
convenient for trial. Where the inconvenience in litigating in the chosen
forum is foreseeable at the time of contracting, "it should be incumbent
on the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the con-
tractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for
all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court."' 115 The supreme
court concluded that because the insured failed to make this requisite
showing, the forum selection clause at issue was enforceable and the trial
court clearly abused its discretion in refusing to enforce it.116
The court then turned to whether the forum selection clause should be
enforced by mandamus. The court explained that it has consistently
granted mandamus relief to enforce another type of forum selection
clause, an arbitration agreement, and that it saw no meaningful distinc-
tion between this type of forum selection clause at issue and arbitration
clauses. The court emphasized that subjecting a party to trial in a forum
other than that agreed upon and requiring an appeal to vindicate the
rights granted in a forum-selection clause is clear harassment. Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the insurer did not have an adequate rem-
edy by appeal and that mandamus relief was therefore appropriate. 117
B. CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INSURANCE POLICIES
The Houston Court of Appeals set forth Texas choice of law principles
for determining which state's law governs the interpretation of an insur-
114. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 111,114-15, 120 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
115. Id. at 112-13 (quoting Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).
116. Id. at 111-15.
117. Id. at 115-20. Two months after this holding, the supreme court granted manda-
mus relief in a second case to enforce a forum selection clause in an insurance policy. See
In re Automated Collection Techs., Inc., 156 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2004).
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ance policy. 118 Pursuant to Article 21.42 of the Texas Insurance Code, 119
Texas law governs when: (1) the insurance proceeds are payable to a
Texas citizen or inhabitant; (2) the policy is issued by an insurer doing
business in Texas; and (3) the policy is issued in the course of the insurer's
business in Texas. Because a corporation is an inhabitant only of its state
of incorporation, the court found that because the insured was incorpo-
rated in Nevada, it could not be considered an inhabitant of Texas. Thus,
Article 21.42 did not apply.1 20 In the absence of a statutory directive, the
court proceeded to determine which state had the most significant rela-
tionship under the factors in section 6 of the Restatement.1 21 When the
policy provides nationwide liability coverage, the places of contracting
and negotiation, and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incor-
poration, and place of business of the parties are the primary factors to be
considered. Applying these factors, the court found that the insurer was
a Texas corporation with its principal place of business in Texas, the con-
tracts were negotiated in Texas, the policy was issued in Texas, the premi-
ums were to paid in Texas, and notices were to be submitted in Texas.
The court also determined that Texas had a strong interest in the outcome
of a coverage dispute involving a Texas insurer and insured, but that Lou-
isiana had little interest in whether any settlements or judgments were
paid by the insured or by its insurers or in regulating an exclusion in a
Texas policy. Thus, the application of Texas law was proper.
122
118. Reddy Ice Corp. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 145 S.W.3d 337, 340-46 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
119. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981).
120. Reddy Ice Corp., 145 S.W.3d at 340-44.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
122. Reddy Ice Corp., 145 S.W.3d at 344-46; see also Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Emer-
gency Servs., Inc., No. 01-02-00929-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6885, at *16-28 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 29, 2004, pet. denied) (applying the most significant rela-
tionship test and finding that, under either the Restatement section pertaining to contract
actions or to the section pertaining to fraud and misrepresentation actions, the application
of Texas law was proper).
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